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ABSTRACT
The losses arising from a system being hit by cyber attacks can
be staggeringly high, but defending against such attacks can also
be costly. This work proposes an attack countermeasure selection
approach based on cost impact analysis that takes into account the
impacts of actions by both the attacker and the defender.
We consider a networked system providing services whose pro-
vision depends on other components in the network. We model the
costs and losses to service availability from compromises and defen-
sive actions to the components, and show that while containment
of the attack can be an effective defensive strategy, it can be more
cost-efficient to allow parts of the attack to continue further whilst
focusing on recovering services to a functional state. Based on this
insight, we build a countermeasure selection method that chooses
the most cost-effective action based on its impact on expected losses
and costs over a given time horizon. Our method is evaluated using
simulations in synthetic graphs representing network dependencies
and vulnerabilities, and found to perform well in comparison to
alternatives.
1 INTRODUCTION
Organisations providing services across the Internet or otherwise
connected to an external network face the possibility of cyber-
attacks against their systems. Consequently, such organisations
should invest in cyber security to protect their services, both to
lower the risk of attacks, and to reduce the impact when they occur.
Determining the desired level for this investment, and its correct
application, is not as straightforward as attempting to secure every-
thing fully. The literature on cyber security investment has shown
that a company should never invest to the extent as to cover all
potential vulnerabilities or weaknesses [9], and that a company
should retain some part of the security investment budget for when
an attack event has taken place [5, 10]. Furthermore, given the
existence of unknown vulnerabilities and exploits [16], not all even-
tualities can be prepared against. Additionally, security actions can
cause limitations to availability, e.g. reductions to communication
between systems or users, or loss of compatibility between software
applications due to patching. Combined, these observations lead
to a concern over the cyber-resilience of the system consisting of
services the organisation provides and the related network, i.e. the
ability of the system to withstand and recover from cyber attacks.
Given the possibility that an attack against an organisation’s sys-
tem will occur, some cyber-security investment should be allocated
into improving the ability of the system to cope during an attack,
and recover to normal functionality. The actions organisations take
to mitigate the effects of attacks is the subject of the literature in
attack countermeasure selection, reviewed by [15]. In contrast to
existing work on countermeasure selection, we take a longer term
view by focusing on network resilience, forcing the countermeasure
selection to consider impacts over time, and recovery dynamics.
We propose a method for countermeasure selection based on
cost impact assessment of both attacker and defender actions, in
a medium-to-long-run setting including recovery dynamics. The
impacts of actions are estimated using an approach that builds on
the attack impact analysis approach by [1, 2], which uses attack
graphs (AGs) and dependency graphs (DGs) to estimate attack im-
pact. Our work adds a cost structure, specifying costs for loss of
node availability, the countermeasures, and recovery actions. This
extends the impact assessment beyond attack impact alone, includ-
ing the cost impact of defender’s actions alongside that from attack
steps for a more general analysis. The structure enables dynamic
semi-automatic countermeasure selection based on the overall costs
of alternative countermeasure and recovery strategies. This allows
our method to make more nuanced countermeasure decisions, bal-
ancing attack containment and focus on recovery according to the
situation to improve the efficiency of countermeasure strategies.
Our main contribution on the countermeasure selection side,
beyond the use of a novel impact assessment approach, is a method
to evaluate the effectiveness of each countermeasure based on its
expected impact on the system. This includes considering the effects
of the countermeasure on the possible evolution of the attack, and
on the network’s provision of services, both immediately and in a
longer term. We achieve this by using the network attack graph to
form expectations of possible attack paths and their likelihoods, and
using the impact assessment method to estimate the cost impact of
the different states the system could end up in which are within a
few steps from the current state.
We test our method by simulations on a small sample graph
and on synthetic graphs, against two alternative methods. The
results suggest that our method provides more cost-efficient coun-
termeasure selection than the alternatives tested, even when the
average service performance is close. As our method builds on the
attack impact assessment by [1, 2], we compared our method to
an alternative that employs the principles of their attack impact
assessment without our extensions. The comparisons show that for
the purposes of countermeasure selection, our extensions to their
analysis add considerable performance improvements in terms of
cost effectiveness and average service performance.
In summary, our contributions include: 1. Extending the attack
impact assessment model by [1, 2] into a more general model for
impact assessment including defender actions, via modelling service
losses and the costs of the countermeasures, and adding a change
to enable the modelling of recovery, which the original formulation
does not support; 2. Introducing an approach to countermeasure
selection based on estimating the expected impacts of actions; 3.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
90
4.
03
08
2v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  5
 A
pr
 20
19
Showing that considering recovery and the costs of actions over
time can yield a more efficient countermeasure selection.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Sec. 2 discusses related
work. Sec. 3 introduces our impact analysis graph model, including
concepts and definitions from [1] which our model builds upon. Sec.
4 introduces our approach to countermeasure selection in a network.
Sec. 5 evaluates the method against two alternative approaches,
using simulations. Finally, Sec. 6 concludes.
2 RELATEDWORK
In a general sense, resilience is the ability of a system (an organism,
a network, a country) to withstand and recover from adverse events
such as natural disasters, epidemics, system faults or cyber attacks.
Due to the wide use of the term in different fields of study, various
definitions for the term have been used [11]. In the definition we
shall use, the defining characteristic of resilience is the recovery
and adaptation exhibited by a system during and after an adverse
event. The systems ability to simply weather an event, whichwe call
robustness after [8], covers only part of resilience in our definition.
A key work in the field of resilience measurement, Bruneau et
al. [3] introduced a way to measure resilience based on a system
performance curve. Their method involves calculating resilience
loss, the performance lost due to lack of resilience. This is given
by difference between the level of a performance metric and its
optimal value over time, from the start of the disruption to when
performance has recovered fully. While alternative measures have
also been proposed, such as a method combining two metrics for
measuring the resilience of a backbone network by Sterbenz et al.
[18, 19], approaches based on performance curves such as [3] and
its variations have become common in the literature for quantifying
system resilience, used in works such as [8, 21].
Our work differs frommost of the existing literature on resilience
by focusing on the actions and investment choices during an ongo-
ing event (attack) and the recovery phase, instead of preparatory
planning and capability investment. This focus is intended to ad-
dress the evolving nature of systems, and adaptation to conditions
such as loss of confidentiality or network unavailability etc. Most
cyber resilience works have focused on the planning and design
stage, such as [8, 17, 19, 22]. Additionally, papers considering re-
active response and recovery apply to narrow settings which do
not apply to our work. For example, the approaches by [4, 21] only
apply to settings where a control action to correct for a deviation
from desired performance is easy to determine in advance, and to
apply automatically.
In the cyber security literature, countermeasure selection
refers to approaches to choose actions to counter security events
(cyber attacks) [15]. These methods focus on defense against attack
events, and as such mainly involve the stages before and during an
attack: modelling the system, and the potential attacks and coun-
termeasures; identifying the attack and making a countermeasure
choice. We believe that by introducing longer-term resilience con-
siderations into this mix, countermeasure investments can be made
with higher efficiency.
Recent frameworks for attack countermeasure selection have
commonly used graphical models, including attack graphs [15].
The combined use of attack graphs (AGs) and dependency graphs
(DGs) for analysing the impact of cyber attacks has been explored
by Albanese et al. [1, 2]. Additionally, Kotenko and Doynikova [6,
13, 14] use these graph tools as a foundation for a countermeasure
selection system. Both the approaches connect nodes in the attack
graph with relevant parts of the DG information to quantify the
impact of a given attack step, but differ in how the DGs are used.
The method in [1, 2] holds the DG alongside the AG as part
of the dynamic analysis, with the effects of attack steps on the
DG held as key for impact assessment. By contrast, [12] focuses on
enriching the system’s AGwith topological and service dependency
information, and using this augmented AG for the analysis. The DG
is employed as a source of component importance information at
the pre-processing stage. In this work, we shall follow the approach
in [1, 2] of using the DG ’live’ during the analysis. This is because
for our approach to countermeasure choice and resilience analysis,
the dynamic effects from attack steps on the dependencies provide
useful information beyond that obtained by using the dependency
information statically.
Our proposed approach has similarities to the countermeasure
selection technique in [13] in the use of AGs and DGs, using costs
to quantify attack impact, and basing countermeasure decisions on
costs. The key differences include our longer-term focus, explicit
time dynamics as opposed to comparative statics, and our approach
to cost and component valuation via the impact on the final services
as opposed to giving each component an intrinsic value.
3 IMPACT ANALYSIS MODELLING
3.1 Attack and dependency graphs
Attack graphs are a network risk-assessment tool that provide a
graphical representation of actions that an attacker can take to
reach an attack goal, for example root access on a given server, by
exploiting vulnerabilities that exist in the network. Various types
of attack graphs have been proposed in the literature, depending
on the application. The work presented here will use the defini-
tion of Vulnerability Dependency Graph from [1], a compact AG
representation used in their work on attack impact assessment.
Definition 3.1. (Vulnerability Dependency Graph, [1]) Given a set
of vulnerability exploits V , a set of security conditions C , a require relation
Rr ⊆ C ×V , and an imply relation Ri ⊆ V ×C , a vulnerability dependency
graph G is the directed graph G = (V , R), where R = {f (vi , vj ) ∈ V ×V :
∃c ∈ C, (vi , c) ∈ Ri ∧ (c, vj ) ∈ Rr } is the edge set.
The vertices consist of nodes representing vulnerability exploits
such as "remote exploit of vulnerability V on host A", while the
edges implicitly contain security conditions such as "user access to
host A". A require relation Rr between a security condition c and a
vulnerability exploit vi means that c must be satisfied for vi to be
exploited, and an imply relation Ri betweenvj and c means that ex-
ploit of vj leads to condition c being satisfied [20]. The edges in the
set R link pairs of vulnerabilities that are connected via a security
condition by what [2] call a "prepare-for" relation. A prepare-for
relation exists between vi and vj if vi has an edge to security con-
dition c representing an imply relation (exploit of vi implies the
attainment of security condition c), and c has an edge to vj repre-
senting a require relation (the exploit of vj requires the condition
c to have been obtained by the attacker). This AG representation
leaves the security conditions implicit, as the edges are defined as
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going through a condition but these are not shown, with the end
result resembling a dependency graph of the vulnerabilities.
Dependency graphs (DGs) represent dependency relations be-
tween the various components of a system. For example, a server
may require input from various databases to perform its function,
which themselves may depend on other components. The DGs in
this work represent the availability dependencies of the services
provided by software applications in a network. At a given time
t , the availability of a given node shall be measured as the service
level provided at time t as proportion of the service level normally
expected of the application, so that full service is represented by
1, while 0 means the service is unavailable. The DG nodes repre-
sent software applications that provide services across the network,
such that applications elsewhere in the network are dependent on
them in order to function fully. Dependencies between services are
represented by directed edges between the DG nodes. For our DGs,
we use the definition of a Generalised Dependency Graph from [1]:
Definition 3.2. (Generalised Dependency Graph, [1, 2]) A gener-
alised dependency graph is a labeled directed acyclic graph D = (H, Q, ϕ),
where: H is a set of nodes, corresponding to network components;Q = {(h1, h2) ∈
H × H : h1 depends on h2 } is a set of edges; ϕ : H → F is a mapping that
associates with each node h ∈ H a function f ∈ F s.t. the arity of f is equal
to the outdegree of h∗. For each node h ∈ H , hÛdenotes the set of components
that depend on h and Ûh denotes the set of components h depends on.
The first two points in the DG definition describe the basic struc-
ture of the dependency graph (which nodes are dependent on which
others), while the mapping ϕ describes the type of dependency that
each node h ∈ H has on its supplier nodes Ûh. We consider the same
dependency function types as in ([1, 2]):
fr (a1, ...,an ) =
{
1 if ∃i ∈ [1,n] s .t . ai = 1
0 otherwise
(1)
fd (a1, ...,an ) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
ai (2)
fs (a1, ...,an ) =
{
1 if ai = 1 ∀i ∈ [1,n]
0 otherwise
(3)
where ai represents the availability value of a network component
which the current component is directly dependent on, and n is the
total number of components on which the current component is
dependent (i.e. for component hi we have n = | Ûhi |). Here, fr is a
redundancy-type dependency (logical OR), fs is strict dependency
on all supplier nodes (logical AND), and fd means availability of
h is the mean of the availabilities of all of its suppliers (degraded
availability). For example, in the sample shown in Fig. 1, for hT we
have f (s( ÛhT , t)) = fs (a1) = fs (s(hC , t)).
3.2 Attack impact analysis
Our impact assessment approach builds on the Impact Assess-
ment Graph (IAG) proposed in [1], with combined use of an AG
and a DG for analysing attack impacts. We proposes a slight sim-
plification relative to [1]. Specifically, in the IAG we use an AG
without the compromise time-windows feature in the original, as
the handling of time in our model makes this feature unnecessary.
∗"If h is a terminal node in the dependency graph (i.e. it does not depend on any other
node), we assume ϕ(h) is the constant (0-ary) function 1"[1].
Definition 3.3. (Impact Assessment Graph, modified [1]) Given a
vulnerability dependency graph A = (V , R) and a generalised dependency
graph D = (H, Q, ϕ), an impact assessment graph is a 4-tuple (A, D, F , η)
where: F ⊆ V ×H ; η : F → [0, 1] is a function that associates with each pair
(v, h) ∈ F a real number in the [0, 1] interval representing the percentage
reduction in the availability of network component h caused by vulnerability
exploit v .
Effectively, the IAG consists of both the AG and the DG in full, and
connections in between them in the form of the function η that
describes how the availability of the components in the DG are
affected by vulnerabilities in the AG.
The network status function [1] defines how the status of a
node evolves over time with relation to the availabilities of its de-
pendencies. The definition states that a network status function
s for a DG D assigns each DG node h a value in the range [0, 1],
capped by the node’s dependency function f over the statuses of the
node’s dependencies. That is, the statuses of the components that h
depends on define a maximum availability level for h, but the status
of h can be below this maximum if directly affected by an attack.
However, the functional form of the network node status function
s(h, t) in [1] does not allow modelling recovery in a component’s
status due to the way the previous period’s status s(h, t − 1) enters
the function definition. A bad availability status one period will
continually punish the statuses in future periods, even if a recov-
ery or vulnerability patching has taken place. Therefore, we have
redefined the node status function to keep track of all vulnerability
exploits that are in effect at time t (either newly exploited, or ones
that were exploited and their related security conditions remain
compromised), each of which may have a direct impact on h. Our
reformulation also introduces a multiplicative interaction between
the direct and indirect availability effects, replacing the minimum
function in the original. In this way, the direct and indirect effects in-
teract to set the effective availability, in contrast to the dependency
availability effect only acting as a cap on the effective availability
level. These changes also enable multiple exploits affecting a node
h ∈ H directly, which the original formulation does not support.
Our proposed formulation for the node status function is:
s(h, t) = f (s( Ûh, t))
∏
v ∈Ve,t
(1 − η(v,h)) (4)
where Ve,t is the set of AG nodes that are in an exploited state
at time t ; η(v,h) ∈ [0, 1] is the availability effect that the exploit
of vulnerability v has on component h (0 for no effect, 1 for fully
unavailable); Ûh is the set of components that h is dependent on;
and f (s( Ûh, t)) is the availability effect on h from its dependencies.
Note that a component recovery is represented as the removal of
a vulnerability v from the exploited set Ve,t , while a patching of
a vulnerability will remove the vulnerability v from the full set
of vulnerabilities V . The status of network component h is com-
posed of two effects on availability: 1. Compromise effect (direct):
(1 − η(v,h)), the effect of compromise (vulnerability exploit) in the
AG node v which corresponds to component h; 2. Dependency
availability effect (indirect): f (s( Ûh, t)), the effect of unavailabilities
in the components that h is dependent on, of type fr (redundancy),
fd (degradation) or fs (strict dependence).
We use the example from [1] to show how our approach differs.
The sample represents the network of a small organisation with two
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final services, an online shopping Web Service (hA) and a Mobile
Order Tracking app (hC ), their local cache databases (hB and hD for
online shopping and order tracking, respectively), and a separate
subnetwork for the internal logic and a central database powering
the services.
Figure 1: Impact assessment graph, adapted from [1, Fig. 11]
The dependency structure and potential attack paths in the sam-
ple network are shown in Fig. 1, which recreates the impact as-
sessment graph figure from [1, Figure 11]. The figure has the AG
on the left, and a DG on the right. The nodes in the AG represent
vulnerabilities in the different network components. The DG nodes
are network components: hA to hG provide intermediate services
(internal services), while hS and hT are customer-facing services
(the product of the organisation). The exploit of a vulnerability
vi affects the availability of the corresponding component hi , and
the availability of components which are dependent on hi . The
dashed lines in Fig. 1 show the availability impact of a vulnerability,
η(vi ,hi ), for example η(vF ,hF ) = 0.7 means hF will lose 70% of its
availability when vF is exploited (unless the availability of nodes it
depends on has decreased, affecting hF availability).
The final key component for attack impact analysis using the
IAG is the utility derived from the components in the dependency
graph: ∀h ∈ H ,u(h) gives the utility for node h. The utility is, in
effect, the value of the service provided by a given node at each
time unit. The work in [1, 2] assume that all the DG nodes are
given a utility value which remains static during the analysis. By
contrast, we believe that intermediate services provide value only
when at least a part of the final service to which they contribute is
online (available). Therefore, we only set values for the final service
nodes (hS and hT in the sample), with the value of the other nodes
only reflecting the impact they have on the value arising from
the final services. In this way, we use the dependency structure to
dynamically determine the values of all intermediate services.
In contrast to [1, 2], we propose to introduce a comprehensive
cost model that takes into account the costs of node unavailability,
costs of different countermeasures, and recovery costs. Doing so,
we aim to move beyond the original attack impact assessment to
a more general impact assessment by including the estimation of
the impacts of defensive actions as well as those of the attacker.
Countermeasure decisions can then made based on expected costs
over time, instead of only relying on the projected impacts of at-
tacker actions. Our work uses the impact analysis framework as
part of an approach countermeasure selection, employing the im-
pact estimates for determining which countermeasure is the most
cost effective at a given attack situation. For this purpose, leaving
out the analysis of costs of the countermeasure actions could lead
to inefficient choices of countermeasures, as the application of a
countermeasure can reduce the availability of the services.
3.3 Attacks, countermeasures and recovery
We model attacks as sequences of attack steps, i.e. atomic exploits
of a single vulnerability in an AG, with potential to lead to further
steps. They enter the network via particular "entry nodes" which
are directly exploitable by the attacker. For example, in Fig. 1, an
attack can start by an exploit of vA or vC . The potential next steps
are then determined by the AG structure – for example, if vA was
exploited, the possible next steps are vB and vE .
The time to compromise a vulnerability vi (for i ∈ V ) is tvi = 1
for all vulnerabilities, so only one attack step can occur during a
time unit t . We assume that the probability that an attacker takes
an attack step at a given time step is pstep .Similarly, we introduce
a parameter reflecting the chance that a countermeasure/recovery
application is slower than the attacker’s next step, pf ast−step , so
the attacker’s next step gets executed just before the defender’s one.
This provides some uncertainty to the timing of events, to avoid
limiting us to the case where the defense always beats the attacker
to the next step, which seems unrealistic.
Countermeasures (CMs) are actions aimed at reducing the
impact of an attack. In general these could be of two types, ones
affecting the network’s security capabilities which can be taken
before an attack but not during one (capability changes: redundancy
additions, back-ups), and others which can be taken at any time
(dynamic countermeasures). In this paper, we consider one type
of dynamic countermeasure, patching vulnerabilities. An another
type of dynamic countermeasure, disabling communication links,
will be considered in future work, along with capability changes.
The effect of patching is to remove a vulnerability node from the
AG, restricting potential attack paths. A patching action requires
tP units of time to implement, and comes at a cost consisting of
a direct cost and a service impact, introduced in Sec. 3.4. Fig. 2(a)
illustrates the case where vC is patched after an exploit. Note that
patching does not clear the related DG node hC from compromise,
as recovery is handled separately.
Recovery refers to actions that the network owner uses to re-
cover the functionality of components (DG nodes) compromised
by vulnerability exploits. To simplify the analysis, we consider the
case where there is only one recovery method, which is akin to
component replacement. This consists of a full replacement of a
failed or compromised component by a new (clean and working)
version with the same functionality (and same vulnerabilities), as-
sumed to take tR time, and cost cR . Both the time and cost values
are assumed equal across components. In terms of the graphs, this
corresponds to making a DG node fully functional and the corre-
sponding AG vulnerability not exploited (although it will remain
in the AG, so may be compromised later). This is shown in Fig. 2(b),
showing recovery of hC after it has been compromised by exploit
of vC . More detail is provided in Sec. 3.6.
3.4 Costs of actions
Our modelling of costs contains direct costs for each action, i.e.
node recovery cost cR and patching cost cP , in addition to indirect
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(a) Defender patchesvC (hC not cleaned automatically).
Takes tP time units to come to effect.
(b) Defender recovers hC . hC remains temporarily un-
available. After t + tR , hC and hT are up again.
(c) Graph legend
Figure 2: Patching and recovery actions and their effects on the system
costs in terms of service loss due to dependencies. While the direct
costs do matter, the key element of our cost modelling is the loss to
the provision of final services caused by component unavailability.
Service loss due to unavailability of DG node h at time t :
д(h, t) =
∑
hj ∈HS
(
u(hj ) ·
(
fs (s( Ûhj , t) | s(h, t) = s(h, t − 1))−
fs (s( Ûhj , t) | s(h, t))
) ) (5)
where we have used s(hj , t) = fs (s( Ûhj , t)) for hj ∈ HS , which fol-
lows from (4) and the observation that the customer-facing service
nodes hS and hT do not have direct exploits (so only the depen-
dency effect counts for them). The function д(h, t) is the impact of
h’s deviation, at time t , from its previous observed availability level
onto the availability of services.
The costs of the countermeasure and recovery actions con-
sist of two parts: the direct cost for the action (cR for recovery of a
node, cP for patching a node, cD for disabling), and the cost of un-
availability of the network components that are directly impacted
by the action. For example, the observed (after the fact) cost of
patching vulnerability vi at time t is given by:
cpatch (vi , t) = cP +
∑
hj ∈M (vi )
(t+tP∑
τ=t
д(hj ,τ )
)
(6)
where vi is a node in the AG, cP is the direct cost of patching.
M(vi ) represents the set of elements in the DG that are adjacent
to the AG node vi , that is, the components directly affected by the
vulnerability vi . In other words, these are the software where the
vulnerability exists, and where the patching of vi takes place. The
current time period is t , and tP represents the time units required
for the patching. The inner summation adds together the cost of
component hj being unavailable from t to t + tP . The observed
costs due to disabling and node recovery work in a similar manner.
Note that (6) shows the calculation of the observed cost when
we know the path of any attack steps and defender actions and
therefore know д(hj ,τ ) for τ = [t , t + tP ]. For estimating the cost
of an action beforehand, we require an expectation of the state of
the model in terms of attacker steps and defender actions during
the periods in question. In practice, our approach is to estimate
the benefit of an action in terms of an expected trajectory for the
system state, as explained in Sec. 4.
3.5 Performance measurement and resilience
We measure the performance of the networked system with an
overall service provision status, service performance (SP). It is
the weighted sum of the statuses of the client-facing services (the
"product" of the organisation), weighted by their relative utilities
for the organisation. Mathematically, SP at time t is given as:
SPt =
∑
h∈HS
u(h)∑
hk ∈HS u(hk )
s(h, t) (7)
where s(h, t) is the status (availability level) of component h at
time t , u(h) is the utility the organisation derives from the service
component h (during its full availability), and HS is the set of com-
ponents which are client-facing services. In the sample in Fig. 1
we have HS = {hS ,hT }, as the services are hS and hT . When ob-
served over time, this metric can be used to measure the network’s
resilience based on a performance-curve approach for resilience in
the spirit of [3]. From the curve, resilience metrics can be calculated
e.g. according to the approaches by [3] or [8].
3.6 Recovery process
We evaluate our model in a setting with automatic recovery deci-
sions, where the choice of whether to recover a node is based on
the likely benefit versus the costs of the recovery strategy. We keep
this recovery process separate from countermeasure choices, which
simplifies expectation formation for CM selection. Node recovery
is done if it leads to a reduction in losses exceeding the recovery
cost. The loss reduction from recovering node h at time t is:
LR(h, t) = Loss¬R (h, t) − LossR (h, t) (8)
where LossR (h, t) is the loss with recovery, which is:
LossR (h, t) =
tmax∑
τ=t
Et (д(h,τ |s(h,τ ) = 0))+
thor izon∑
τ=tmax
Et (д(h,τ |s(h,τ ) = 1))
(9)
where tmax = t + tR + tP + tD is the time it would take to recover,
patch and re-enable edges (if necessary), and thor izon is the last
time period in the time horizon considered. This metric consists of
the loss from service unavailability from time t until tmax when
the recovery is finished, and from time tmax + 1 onward when the
node will be assumed recovered (and not re-compromisable). Loss
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without recovery, Loss¬R (h, t), is given by:
Loss¬R (h, t) =
thor izon∑
τ=t
Et (д(h,τ |s(h,τ ) = 0)) (10)
3.7 Sample impact analysis for CM selection
Choosing countermeasures by focusing solely on stopping the
progress of an attack means ignoring: 1. the cost of countermeasure
actions (direct and indirect), and 2. recovery of the network toward
a desired state. Disregard to these aspects can lead to choices that
are not efficient in the longer term. Assume that the network in Fig.
1 experiences an attack exploiting vC at t = 0. As vC is exploited,
hC becomes unavailable, and so does hT due to its dependency on
hC . While the exploit of vC already causes considerable damage in
terms of service losses, once an attacker has exploited vC , it can
further exploitvF orvD . While the exploit ofvD only affects hD (as
hC is down) resulting in no change in either cost or SP, an attack on
hF takes down the remaining service hS , causing full loss of service
and cost due to service losses of u(hT ) + u(hS ) per time period.
When applied repeatedly at each step, the marginal impact anal-
ysis approach from [1, 2] would choose to patch the most high-
impact component that could be affected by an attack next. Given
the compromise of vulnerability vC , at the next time step t = 1, the
next attack steps could be vF or vD , affecting components hF and
hD , respectively. Choosing based on only on the potential impacts
of these attack steps, the choice would be to patch vF .Given this
choice, at time t = 1 the attacker could proceed to exploitvD , which
was not patched. The appropriate reaction to this would be to patch
vG , given another round of marginal impact calculation. Finally, to
return to full availability of services, nodes vD and vC need to be
recovered (vc with patching, vD without).
While the above approach is sensible if we want to guarantee
that the higest impact nodes hF and hG are never compromised,
it may not be cost efficient over time. The costs of the actions, or
recovery, are not considered by the above countermeasure strategy.
However, the choice of actions and their order can have a large
impact on the costs, especially those arising from service losses.
Note that, as the service impact cost д(h, t) for node h is nonzero
only when the node causes a change in the status of the services,
the service impact of a given node h can change over time. For
example, the unvailability of hG only impacts services when hF is
available. This changing loss impact can make a great difference on
the overall cost of a countermeasure strategy. For example, if there
is a low probability that the attack will have successfully moved
to a different node before the next time step, it may be better to
not take a countermeasure that contains the attack, but focus on
recovering and patching vC . In the worst case, the attacker has
been able to move fast enough to exploit vF before hC goes offline
for patching and recovery. In this case, all services go down at t = 1,
so recovering hF will have to be done – but this happens without
additional availability impact, as services will be down already.
Again, in the worst case the attacker may move fast enough to
compromise hG before the system hF is taken down for recovery,
so hG will require recovery at t = 3. Even in this worst case the
overall costs could be lower than with the approach from earlier, if
the time to recover is lower than to patch tR < tP . However, this
approach also benefits from there being a chance that the attacker
will not successfully make another step before the defender reacts,
meaning in the best case only hC has to be recovered and patched.
This sample highlights that, depending on the situation, it can be
more cost effective to act reactively to rely on recovery capabilities,
while sometimes a proactively containing the attack can be better.
We built our CM selection approach on cost impact analysis to be
able to find the approach that works best in a given situation.
4 COUNTERMEASURE SELECTION
This section describes our approach to countermeasure selection
based on the cost impacts of defender actions in addition to ex-
pected attack steps. We shall refer to this method as Cost-Impact
Countermeasure Selection, or CICM. Our CM selection algorithm
essentially estimates the impact of all of the countermeasures that
apply to an AG node of interest vs , and returns a list of them in
descending order of their overall benefit relative to the trajectory
that would be expected in absence of a countermeasure. The highest
benefit CM is implemented, provided that the benefit is positive.
The effectiveness of each countermeasure is evaluated by com-
paring the expected costs of the CM to the benefits it is expected
to yield. Our approach uses the direct cost of the action, and two
potential evolutions ("trajectories") of the system: the "expected tra-
jectory" reflects how an attack would be expected to proceed within
the network in the absence of the countermeasure, and measures
what the impact would be in terms of costs due to both availabil-
ity loss and recovery actions. The "deviating trajectory" given a
countermeasure action measures the expected costs due to avail-
ability loss and recovery when the countermeasure is applied. As a
countermeasure initially requires a network component to be taken
offline temporarily, we make a difference between the immediate
and the longer-run impacts of the countermeasure. Therefore, our
measure of the benefit arising from a countermeasure is given by:
B(cm,vi , t) =ea f (vi ) · (thor izon − t) · trajDLR (cm,vi )
+ trajDcurr (cm,vi ) − ccm (11)
where the first part is an estimate of benefit in later time steps,
consisting of the long-run trajectory difference trajDLR (cm,vi )
multiplied by the expected frequency of future attacks exploitingvi ,
ea f (vi ), and the time periods left until the end of the horizon. The
second term is the trajectory difference currently (until the CM has
been successfully applied), and the last term is the direct cost of the
CM, ccm . The expected attack frequency to node vi , ea f (vi ), is an
estimate of the probability that the attacker will attempt to exploit
node vi again. We estimate this by approximating the probability
of the shortest viable (not patched) path from the attacker node A
to vi . This we calculate as the step probability pstep to the power
of the number of edges on the shortest viable attack path from A to
vi . The approximation is by no means fully accurate, but captures
the behaviour we want, and is considerably simpler and faster than
a rigorous calculation of the exact probability. The exact calculation
would be excessive given the amount of uncertainty arising from
other parts of the model and its environment. Note that this is the
probability of an attacker to (re-)obtain the privileges required to
exploit vi in the future, via any path, and not based on the current
compromise state.
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Figure 3: The stages of the expected trajectory calculation
The current and long-run trajectory differences are given by:
trajDcurr (cm,vi ) = devTrajcurr (cm,vi ) − expTraj(vi ) (12)
trajDLR (cm,vi ) = devTrajLR (cm,vi ) − expTraj(vi ) (13)
The expected trajectories expTraj(vi ), devTraj(cm,vi )curr and
devTraj(cm,vi )lr are calculated by formulating an expected value
for availability impact and costs in the next k time steps. For
expTraj(vi ), this proceeds as follows: 1. From the AG, estimate
what paths the attacker could follow in the next k time steps start-
ing from nodevi , the current head of the attack. Estimate the impact
of each of these potential paths on service availability and on recov-
ery costs. 2. Formulate expected values for the services impact and
costs in each of the time steps from t to t +k , using the paths calcu-
lated in step 1 with the probabilities for each exploit, the probability
for attack step being completed in each time step. An illustration
of this is provided in Fig. 3, for the case where the vulnerability vC
in the sample graph has been exploited at time period t . The first
panel shows the AG situation at time t , the middle panel shows the
possible attack paths in the next k = 2 time steps. The last panel
shows the calculation of the expected values for the time periods
t , t+1, t+2, whereV (S) refers to the valuation (service performance
or cost) at system state S . For brevity, the figure uses a shorthand
for states with only the exploited nodes listed, e.g. Scompr :{vC ,vD }
stands for the state where the set of exploited nodes is {vC ,vD }.
The "deviating trajectory" estimates given a countermeasure cm are
calculated similarly to expTraj(vi ), but assuming that a CM is ap-
plied. An additional difference is that when calculating the expected
values (step 2 above), we further consider the possibility that the
CM is not applied in time before the next step by the attacker, rep-
resented by the probability parameter pf ast−step . We calculate two
deviating trajectories as the application of a CM causes temporary
unavailability at first, before the longer-run effect is obtained.
The split into current and longer term trajectory impacts enables
a simultaneous consideration of the immediate up-front costs of
a countermeasure (direct cost, temporary availability impact) and
the effect it has on the robustness of the network in future periods.
Our method accounts for the future by calculating the "expected
trajectory" impact and the expected number of times such an at-
tack would be observed in the future. This approach provides an
estimate of longer term impact that is considerably more efficient
to calculate than directly considering all possible states in each
future period. A weakness of the method is that it considers future
impacts relative to the current situation, so excludes the impact of
changes to the network or the environment that might happen in
the future. However, such information is unlikely to be available
at the time when the decision is to be made. In the case it was, it
should be possible to establish the robustness of the estimate to
such changes, for example by calculating the impact of the CM
conditional on other CMs being applied as well. However, for the
sake of tractability and scalability, we followed a greedy strategy
looking for the impact of the countermeasures independently.
While we calculate probabilities of various paths of attacks to
formulate the expected trajectory, we do not solve for the whole
network or the full time horizon, as such an approach would not
scale to realistic network sizes. Instead, the method focuses on
"neighborhoods" of the current attack, by looking at potential states
a few time-steps forward from the current "boundary" of the attack.
As another way to simplify the problem, we don’t consider patching
at each of the nodes, but focus on the nodes nearest to the entry (if
patchable) [for future attacks], and those on the attack "boundary"
[for containing the ongoing attack, as well as future attack steps].
5 EVALUATION
We used simulations to investigate the usefulness of the proposed
framework for countermeasure selection, by comparison to two
alternative strategies. The first comparison point is what we call
the Attack Impact Approach (AIA), which we built by adapting
the attack impact assessment approach from [1] to be used for
automated countermeasure selection. While their original work
was not proposed for automated countermeasure selection, we
built a CM selection approach for patching actions using the main
principles of their attack impact assessment method, using their
marginal impact metric for patching choices. To use this approach
in a setting where we care about performance over time, we also
required the method to handle recovery, so included our version
of the node status calculation in AIA. AIA can be considered a
containment approach, as it chooses patching actions that apply to
the vulnerabilities exploitable next by the attacker, not ones that
apply to the already exploited vulnerabilities. This has the potential
for stopping the attacker from compromising important nodes,
but applying CMs on healthy components will lead to temporary
availability losses, which can be costly.
The second comparison is to a strategy where a patch is always
applied to the latest exploited vulnerability, without considering
costs or alternative actions. We call this PLE, for "Patch Latest Ex-
ploit". This approach rejects containment in favour of blocking the
last used attack paths from being exploitable in the future, effec-
tively limiting future exposure while accepting current risk. PLE
benefits from limiting the availability loss from CM actions, as ac-
tions are only applied to nodes that already suffer from reduced
availability. While the two comparison approaches represent ex-
tremes in terms of containment and treatment focus, our approach
is intended to be able to choose a cost-efficient approach some-
where in between these extremes based on the attack situation. In
the simulations, the same recovery recovery process, described in
section 4 is used for all of the approaches.
We ran tests under two settings: the sample graph in Fig. 1, and
randomly generated synthetic graphs. The sample graph provides
a useful basis for comparisons as the attack impact assessment
method by [1, 2] was demonstrated on it. The generated graphs are
directed acyclic graphs of a specified size (in terms of nodes). For
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simplicity, the number of AG nodes was restricted to match that
of the DG nodes. To control the structure, we have restricted the
maximum number of parents of a node (nodes dependent on the
node) to three. The connections between the AG and DG nodes
are chosen at random, meaning that the vulnerabilities in the AG
correspond to random system components (in DG), and the attack
paths on the AG can be considerably different from paths in the
dependency structure. Furthermore, in the DG, the number of de-
pendencies (children) of each node are chosen at random, as are the
dependency functions for each node. For each DG, two nodes are
allocated as service nodes. In the AG, the number of children of a
given node (number of further vulnerability exploits made possible
by a given exploit) is drawn at random. To introduce attack entry
points, we add a node representing the attacker’s starting point,
and its children drawn among the other nodes are the entry nodes.
Additionally, probability values for the AG edges are set, repre-
senting the ease of exploiting a node, drawn from a distribution
corresponding to the access complexity metric of CVSS scores [7].
We simulated randomly generated attacks into each graph in
question. The attacks follow a path towards a goal node, which
is picked from among the AG nodes with the highest availabil-
ity impact on the final services (the single highest impact one, or
drawn among the shared highest impact nodes). Each chosen edge
is picked from those along the paths to the goal, based on a draw
between viable candidates, where the distribution is based on the
edge probability values (representing access complexity). This cre-
ates variety across simulations, approximating different attacker
choices based on e.g. different skill levels. One vulnerability exploit
is allowed per time period. If a given step is not possible, due to a
CM action, the attacker attempts another exploit that is on a path
to the goal. If the goal becomes unreachable, the attack will stop.
Unless otherwise stated, the simulations use the following pa-
rameter values: one unit of time to compromise a vulnerability
tvi = 1, two units to patch a vulnerability (tP = 2), and one to
recover a node tR = 1. The direct costs are cP = 2 for patching,
and cR = 3 for node recovery. There is a 30% probability that an
attacker takes an attack step at a given time step (pstep = 0.3), and
pf ast−step = 0.3, so there is a 30% chance that a given CM/recovery
application is slower than the attacker’s next step.
5.1 Results for the sample graph
The simulation results on the sample graph are shown in Fig. 4. The
figure shows a comparison of our method to the two alternative
CM schemes, both for the resilience curve (SP metric), and for costs
and service losses over time. The curves represent the mean values
for the metrics (SP, overall costs) across 1000 simulated attacks; the
blue curve ("CICM") indicates our method, the orange one is for
PLE and the green for AIA. The two upper panels show simulations
where the attacks are detected immediately at the first step, and
the defender actions (countermeasures, recovery) can be started
immediately. By comparison, on the lower two panels, there is a
delayed detection of the initial attack step, in which the attacker
has already done one step before a step is detected (that is, the
second step overall) and the defender actions start. We believe that
this case is more close to reality, as attacks can remain undetected
in a network for long periods of time.
(a) Resilience curve (SP); fully detected
steps
(b) Costs and service losses over time;
fully detected steps
(c) Resilience curve (SP); 1 undetected
step
(d) Costs and service losses over time; 1
undetected step
Figure 4: Simulation results for the sample graph
Comparing the results for our approach to those from the AIA
alternative, we notice our method outperforming AIA both with
regard to service performance over time, and the overall costs. The
difference between our method and AIA becomes large early on and
fails to recover afterwards. This is true whether we look at the case
with immediate attack detection (upper panels), or the case with
delayed detection (lower panels). Using our approach, the mean SP
was over 20% better (23% for immediate detection, 27% for delayed),
and the overall costs were 42% lower on average than for AIA (for
both immediate and delayed detection). The Wilcoxon signed-rank
test rejected the hypothesis of the difference being zero for SP and
overall costs in both immediate and delayed case, suggesting that
the performance difference is statistically significant. The result
appears to be due to a reduced service availability, which causes
the similarity in the SP and overall costs (of which service losses
is a part). As these are average curves over randomised attacks,
some of the detail related to the individual runs is averaged out,
but it seems that AIA has a harder time purging the attack from
the system than the other approaches, so the difference to other
approaches remains until the end of the time window shown.
The PLE approach exhibits performance roughly matching ours,
both when the detection of the attack is instant (upper panels),
and when there is a delay (lower panels). In fact, the difference be-
tween the approaches was found statistically insignificant using the
Wilcoxon test. In the case of this graph, this result can be expected.
As discussed in Sec. 3.7, to obtain good CM selection performance,
the initial exploit will always be patched in this sample graph as
the services are directly and fully dependent on the entry nodes.
Additionally, the small size of the sample graph limits the variety
in attacker steps, and thus on the CM choices of the defender.
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Table 1: Comparing mean values of performance metrics,
our approach (CICM) vs AIA; immediate detection
CICM Difference: CICM - AIA
DG size 10 20 50 10 20 50
diff. # +/- diff. # +/- diff. # +/-
SP 0.862
(0.301)
0.904
(0.243)
0.946
(0.169)
0.168
(0.352)
95/3 0.132
(0.298)
95/2 0.077
(0.224)
100/0
p-value - - - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 -
Cost 3.49
(7.14)
2.71
(5.92)
1.84
(4.32)
-3.91
(8.15)
4/96 -3.25
(7.00)
0/100 -2.17
(5.33)
0/100
p-value - - - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 -
Notes: 100 graphs per size, 100 attack simulations each; "# +/-": count of positive/negative diffs.
Table 2: Comparing mean values of performance metrics,
our approach (CICM) vs PLE
Immediate attack detection
CICM Difference: CICM - PLE
DG size 10 20 50 10 20 50
diff. # +/- diff. # +/- diff. # +/-
SP 0.862
(0.301)
0.904
(0.243)
0.946
(0.169)
0.001
(0.112)
42/19 0.000
(0.110)
38/30 0.000
(0.080)
29/38
p-value - - - 0.01 - 0.17 - 0.00 -
Cost 3.49
(7.14)
2.71
(5.92)
1.835
(4.32)
-0.03
(2.69)
34/58 -0.03
(2.59)
43/56 0.04
(2.23)
36/64
p-value - - - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.02 -
Delayed attack detection, two undetected steps
CICM Difference: CICM - PLE
DG size 10 20 50 10 20 50
diff. # +/- diff. # +/- diff. # +/-
SP 0.801
(0.361)
0.852
(0.302)
0.901
(0.235)
0.044
(0.235)
78/19 0.034
(0.197)
71/21 0.020
(0.154)
68/25
p-value - - - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 -
Cost 5.04
(8.86)
4.16
(7.60)
3.33
(6.32)
-1.09
(5.60)
11/86 -0.96
(4.85)
8/91 -0.80
(4.08)
6/94
p-value - - - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 -
Notes: 100 graphs per size, 100 attack simulations each; "# +/-": count of positive/negative differences.
5.2 Results for randomly generated graphs
Simulations were ran on graphs of different sizes, and varying the
detection delay between no delay and a delay of two steps. The size
classes vary the number of nodes in the DG (10, 20 and 50-node
DGs), with a corresponding number of AG nodes. We generated
100 graphs of each size, and ran 100 random attacks on each graph.
Table 1 shows the results for comparisons to the AIA approach in
the case of immediate detection. The results for delayed detection
are overall very similar, so we have omitted them to save space. We
found a considerable benefit for CICM in terms of both the SPmetric
and overall cost. While the size of the difference in overall costs
between the approaches gets smaller with the size of the graphs, due
to a general improvement of both of the approaches, the relative cost
saving for CICM is around 53-54% across graph sizes for immediate,
and 46-51% for delayed detection. Using the Wilcoxon signed-rank
test, we find that CICM demonstrated statistically significantly
better results than AIA for both of the metrics.
Comparisons to the PLE strategy are displayed in Table 2.When
there is no delay in attack detection, our approach performs, on
average, almost identically to PLE strategy in terms of the perfor-
mance metric SP. The difference values are practically zero, and
the Wilcoxon test fails to reject the null hypothesis of equal means
for SP for the 20-node case. On the side of overall cost, the differ-
ence magnitudes are also small. While the simulations show CICM
slightly outperforming PLE on average for 10 and 20-node graphs,
with 50-node graphs the results are mixed. Overall, CICMwas more
cost-efficient in 64% of the 50-node graphs simulated, but the mean
difference over all graphs is in favour of PLE (2% cost difference).
The main message here is: if the attack is detected immediately
at the point of entry, there is little difference between CICM and
PLE. This makes sense, as patching the first node stops the attacker
from regaining access to the network after the attack is purged
elsewhere, and immediate detection makes this very effective.
When there is a delay in initial detection of the attack, the bene-
fits of CICM over PLE become clear. There is some evidence of a
benefit on the average service performance relative to PLE (amount-
ing to between 0.2% and 0.5% of the overall value of the output of
the services, on average). Regardless, the main impact is on the
overall cost side, where our method provides average efficiency
improvements over PLE amounting to 18% for 10-node, 19% for
20-node and 20% for 50-node graphs. Importantly, the cost savings
are consistent, with benefits obtained in 90% of all the graphs tested
(see the +/- counts in the lower part of Table 2: 86% of 10-node
graphs had a negative sign for the cost difference, 91% of 20-node
graphs, and 94% of 50-node). The fact that the difference shows up
in cost instead of SP makes sense, as our method chooses actions
based on the overall cost, not on SP. The results also show that
this effect grows with the size of the graph, suggesting that larger
graphs provide more room for choices that improve cost efficiency.
Summarising the findings from Table 2, we conclude that while
a straightforward patching strategy like PLE can yield good results
in terms of service performance, our method provides considerable
cost savings when attacks are detected with a delay.
We investigated the sensitivity of the results to the length of
delay in detection. We varied the number of attack steps that go
undetected before the defender starts their CM selection and recov-
ery processes, with the other parameter values held constant at the
levels mentioned above. For this, we used the 20-node generated
graphs (100 graphs, 100 simulated attacks for each graph), com-
paring to PLE. The results show that the cost savings from CICM
relative to PLE increase drastically when moving from immediate
to delayed detection, with the saving jumping from 1.1% for im-
mediate detection (0 undetected steps) to 11% for one and 19% for
two undetected steps. However, further undetected steps provide
no additional advantage to our approach, with the relative cost
decreasing slightly to 18% and 17% for 3 and 4 undetected steps,
respectively. The reason for the initial jump is clear, as the attacker
holds more ground in the network and has more possibilities to
pursue, and the PLE strategy loses its edge when there are choices
to be made. The reduction to the benefit at higher number of unde-
tected steps is due to an increase in average overall cost faced by
both approaches, so the difference is smaller relative to this level.
Sensitivity of the results to different assumptions about the cost
structure was also tested. These were again run for the 20-node
graphs, and for delayed detection with 2 undetected steps, which
provided the highest cost impact in the delay sensitivity tests. The
tests consisted of varying two different settings relating to costs:
the utility obtained from services per time unit, which affects the
indirect costs arising from node unavailability; the ratio of the direct
cost of recovery to the direct cost of patching, which can affect the
cost-effectiveness of patching relative to recovery actions.
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Figure 5: Sensitivity to different cost parameter levels
Fig. 5 shows the results for the cost parameter sensitivity. We can
see two broad patterns: First, the magnitude of the cost difference
between the approaches is reduced as the average service utility
level increases. Second, in most cases a higher cost of recovery
(higher cR/cP ratio) leads to an increase in the cost savings provided
by CICM compared to PLE, other things equal.
The first observation suggests that the higher the potential loss
from unavailability, the less room there is to find benefit from ac-
tions that proactively contains the attack as opposed to treating the
latest compromise. Therefore, the cost-efficient approach becomes
more similar to PLE, which not only treats the latest event but also
patches only nodes that are already down, avoiding additional un-
availability costs. However, the difference between the approaches
is still sizeable, with the smallest difference in Fig. 5 suggesting a
12% average saving using CICM relative to PLE.
The second observation suggests that the higher the cost of re-
covery is relative to patching, the more room there is for CICM to
find cost savings by deviating from treating the latest compromise,
as the cost of taking proactive patching steps is reduced. The aver-
age cost levels of both approaches increases with the cR/cP ratio,
but the rise in the costs incurred is smaller when using CICM than
PLE, leading to an increasing relative benefit.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
We proposed a framework for automated countermeasure selection
based on cost impact analysis of the organisation’s service loss and
costs over a period of time considering both attacker and defen-
sive actions, aiming for a cost-effective approach to maintaining
service functionality. The method was demonstrated via examples
in a sample network, and an evaluation of its countermeasure se-
lection performance was conducted using simulations. The results
suggest that our method outperforms an alternative countermea-
sure selection approach based on the attack impact assessment
method by [1, 2], both in terms of average service performance
and overall costs over a given time window. Comparisons against
a straightforward patching approach showed that, while average
service performance was a close match, our method found more
cost-efficient ways to achieve the goal.
Future work will involve adding more detail into the impact mod-
elling, moving away from the simple DG as used here in favour of a
more flexible dependency model. On the countermeasure selection
side, we shall investigate extending the method to select a combina-
tion of countermeasures and recovery actions in the same decision.
Additionally, we intend to look into the possibility for further im-
provements from POMDP-based methods to attack modelling. We
also intend to extend the method to consider more detailed dis-
abling schemes based on network connectivity. The current model
could estimate the impact of such schemes, but we do not currently
have this additional topological information included in the attack
or dependency graphs. Given this, we are yet to devise a method to
evaluate the system’s performance under such disabling schemes.
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